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Abstract: Kuhn (1977) considered that criteria for scientific theory choice function as values and not as rules 
what implies: i) the debatable character of their attribution, ii) the gradual nature of their compliance and iii) 
the necessity to weigh them up in a multidimensional values-based judgment. Kuhn also emphasized: 1) the 
agent-related nature of processes involving the “recognition of values as reasons” and 2) the non-algorithmic 
and open character of the “justificatory dynamics of science”. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Thomas Kuhn’s “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice” (included in the book 
The essential tension, 1977, pp. 320-339) is still today a major reference in philosophical 
debates on the justification of scientific claims. The text tried to respond to widespread 
charges of relativism directed to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962, 21970a), 
where Kuhn had assumed that the underdetermination of scientific theories by empirical 
evidence (what Kuhn rather restrictedly calls “proof”, Cf. Stanford, 2017) called for 
“techniques of persuasion, or argument and counterargument” (Cf. 1970a, pp. 151-152) in 
theory choice. 
Certainly, this sounded rather more shocking then than it does now. The more than 
forty years passed since its publication have seen the development of argumentation theory 
and argumentation studies and it should not be surprising that we are now in a better position 
to both clarify and assess what Kuhn wanted to say about these problematic questions. 
Although Kuhn does not use the concepts and tools developed by contemporary 
argumentation theorist (not even those already available to him at that time), one of the aims 
of this paper is showing how most of his insights can now be better appreciated by employing 
them. 
Kuhn’s “Objectivity…” (1977) extended and deepened the line of response to received 
criticism he had already outlined in at least two previous texts: 
- the 1969 “Postcript”, included in The Structure’s second edition (1970a) and, 
- “Reflections on my Critics”, his contribution to the collective volume edited by I. 
Lakatos & A. Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970b).  
 
His aim was now trying to identify the kinds of “argument and counterargument” that were 
common in scientific controversies and to expose how they did function in a process of theory 
choice, with the intention of revealing up to what point rationality and objectivity were still 
honored. The difficult part was, nevertheless, that in order to do so, he had to make a 
conceptual work of dissociation (Cf. Tindale 2010) and propose a new way to understand 
both notions of rational justification and objectivity.  
In this paper, I’ll try to analyze Kuhn’s ideas and conceptual proposals using, among 
other things, the tools and framework provided by H. Marraud’s “arguments’ dialectic” 
(2015) whose performance for clarifying scientific argument I have already exploited in my 
recent papers on abduction (2019, forthcoming). 
One of the things that become clear once we face Kuhn’s text is that the topics 
mentioned in its title are approached exactly in the reverse order and I’ll do the same here. 
Thus, Kuhn starts by analyzing the kinds of criteria (kinds of reasons) involved in theory 
choice, revisiting a list he had already offered in previous texts and trying to show that those 
who accuse him of depicting “theory choice” as a non-rational process are misguided. I’ll 
revise these aspects in Section 2 “The Rationality of Theory Choice”. Then, Kuhn states that 
these criteria work not as rules but as values (or maxims or norms, says he, 1977, p. 330). 
This is the central argumentative point, as what Kuhn is pointing at –and allegedly clarifying 
with his illustrative examples from the history of science– is precisely “The Argumentative 
Workings of Values”, as I approach the issue in Section 3. Finally, what remains is to 
vindicate the kind of objectivity (if any) that’s behind this kind of exchanges. I’ll revise 
Kuhn’s suggestions in Section 4 “Objectivity within the Space of Reasons” and Section 5 
“The Rational Dynamics of Science”. 
My main conclusion (expressed by my own title) is that Kuhn’s dissociative concept 
of judgmental subjectivity, called for to replace an elusive (ideally a priori and agent-
independent) objectivity, is probably his most valuable contribution, opening the possibility 
for a more dynamical, practical and definitely agent-based understanding of the exchange of 
reasons in scientific decisions about theoretical choices. 
 
2.  The Rationality of Theory Choice 
 
That there is no algorithmic methodology for systematic theory choice within the sciences 
was, at the same time, the point of departure of Kuhn’s ground-breaking proposal and a well-
established result accepted, by then, by most philosophers of science (as Kuhn duly 
acknowledges).1 The peculiarity of Kuhn’s approach, though is that he does not see this as a 
regrettable condition, “an eliminable imperfection” but as “the essential nature of science” 
(1977, p. 330). I gladly translate Kuhn’s insight here as boldly stating the argumentative 
nature of science. 
Empirical proof –i.e. experimental confirmation (in any case gradual) of the 
observational consequences implied by theories– is never decisive (it underdetermines theory 
choice), but neither are mandatorily decisive, in an absolute way, the value-based “argument 
and counterargument” explored by Kuhn. There is always room for disagreement. 
Furthermore, as Kuhn insists, there is always room for reasonable (even scientifically-based) 
disagreement. Although there are concrete cases where recalcitrant and stubborn positions in 
scientific matters might be identified and criticized as such (by the majority of a community), 
this cannot be done in an algorithmic or unanswerable way. The argumentative situation (as 
it happens in legal matters) remains, as science keeps going on, and theories are assessed and 
accepted as currently valid. 
 
1 “Most philosophers of science would, therefore, I think, now regard the sort of algorithm which has 
traditionally been sought as a not quite attainable ideal” (Kuhn 1977, p. 326). 
This is essential in Kuhn’s account and something that not everybody welcomed in 
1977 (or in 1973, when the lecture that originated the paper took place). In his 1980 review 
on Kuhn’s book, particularly centered on this piece, H. Siegel started by agreeing, to a certain 
extent, with Kuhn. Siegel quoted at length the following paragraph from the “Postcript”, of 
which the text of “Objectivity…” seems to be a more detailed development, and stated that 
“This paragraph of Kuhn’s seems unexceptionable” (Siegel 1980, p. 364): 
 
Nothing about that relatively familiar thesis [i.e. no algorithm] implies either 
that there are no good reasons for being persuaded or that these reasons are not 
ultimately decisive for the group. Nor does it even imply that the reasons for 
choice are different from those usually listed by philosophers of science: 
accuracy, simplicity, fruitfulness and the like. What it should suggest, however, 
is that such reasons function as values and that they can thus be differently 
applied, individually and collectively, by men who concur in honoring them. If 
two men disagree, for example, about the relative fruitfulness of their theories, 
or if they agree about that but disagree about the relative importance of 
fruitfulness and say, scope in reaching a choice, neither can be convicted of a 
mistake. Nor is either being unscientific. There is no neutral algorithm for 
theory-choice, no systematic decision procedure which, properly applied, must 
lead each individual in the group to the same decision (Kuhn, 1970a, 199-200). 
 
But Siegel finally blamed Kuhn for not trying to solve this problem that threats the rationality 
of scientific justification. If the usual criteria are not enough to close the gap, he should be 
looking for meta-criteria (preferably “external” to paradigmatic, self-referential and self-
justifying frameworks) in order to overcome, in a more definitive way, disagreement in 
scientific controversies.2  
Siegel specially criticized Kuhn’s “reluctance to give up the incommensurability 
thesis” (1980, p. 365) that would prevent effective communication and reasonable dispute 
between scientists working within different paradigms. He, ultimately, considers that Kuhn 
“cannot have it both ways” (1980, p. 366), in the sense that, if he is honestly looking for 
criteria and good reasons for, if not settling, at least advancing scientific controversies in a 
rational way, he cannot, at the same time, insist on the idea of incommensurable and 
incommunicable paradigms. 
I think Siegel was absolutely right spotting this kind inconsistency in Kuhn, but the 
truth is that in the text of “Objectivity…” the vocabulary of incommensurability is 
remarkably avoided (though not explicitly denied) and there is even a suggestion towards the 
end of the text about means other-than-linguistic to overcome problems of 
incommunicability. I’ll come to this later. At this point, I will just mention that even 
abandoning the blocking version of incommensurability –something I’m more than happy to 
do–, I somewhat understand Kuhn’s “reluctance” to embrace a too confident view of the 
possibilities of finding a, however complicated, model of theory choice that finally would 
close the rationality gap in the way required by his critics. That is why I think some 
redescriptions of his proposals as leading to a complete traditionally understood methodology 
as R. Nola’s (2000) or those who translate them into Bayesian terms as Salmon’s or Earman’s 
(Cf. Farmakis 2008) somehow miss the point.  
 
2 Siegel mentions in this regard the work conducted by Scheffler (1967). 
And the point is, as I see it, that the context of scientific controversy remains an 
argumentative context (vs. a demonstrative one) all through reasonable debates and 
reasonable theoretical choices made. Those defending an innovative and more fruitful and 
more coherent scientific theory are reasonable and rational as long as they are prepared to 
present assessable, field-relevant reasons for their choices and those who resist the new 
proposal might also be reasonable and rational as long as they do the same. And there is no 
a priori, universally applicable, philosophical way to stop it. Only relatively instable, though 
often robust, assessable as properly discussed, but in the end communal, field-dependent 
choices based on good reasons.3 
This, I claim, is not renouncing rationality but redefining it with a dissociative move. 
Rational people, according to such move, would be those who “give reasons”, “ask for 
reasons”, “look for the best available reasons”, “criticize other’s reasons”, etc. and do so 
mostly using (and sometimes discussing) the standards of the field they are involved in; not 
those who know of the right method for reaching decisions and apply it. Science (as an 
argumentative field) may have agreed on (relatively permanent and even relatively 
constitutive) basic criteria that act as sources of reasonable argument, but, even then, these 
are not going to dictate or determine choices but just guide discussions. This would mean to 
advance a procedural or methodological vs. an achievement-centered notion of rationality. 
Kuhn is happy to look for, describe and discuss those basic criteria that make of 
scientific endeavor what it is –at least for now (Cf. Kuhn 1983). But he is also eager to specify 
the way the items in his non-exhaustive list of criteria work in argumentative exchanges (as 
values, says he, and not as rules) in order to keep scientific discussion and controversy 
feasible and recognizable but, at the same time, open. As is well known, the five criteria 
listed by Kuhn in “Objectivity…”, expressed as desirable characteristics or features eligible 
scientific theories should have, are (Kuhn 1977, pp. 321-322): 
 
1. Being accurate: i.e. empirically adequate (especially regarding predictions) 
according to observation and experimentation.4  
2. Being consistent: both internally (showing absence of contradiction) and 
externally (proving coherent with other theories and background 
assumptions). 
3. Having broad scope: theoretical consequences should be of the kind that 
makes them extensible to phenomena outside its first realm of inquiry in order 
to avoid ad hoc theories.5 
4. Being simple: its explanatory principles should be kept as simple as possible. 
5. Being fruitful: it should reveal (or help revealing) new phenomena, enlarge the 
field of inquiry, open new research perspectives. 
 
3 As philosopher of science A. Cordero has put it: “Science simply did not have the clear and eternal form 
positivists had imagined it have. Nor, for that matter, did it have any invariant form. If, earlier on, the radicalness 
of scientific innovation had blended smoothly with the formalist tenets of logical positivism, the mixture fell 
apart when historical research revealed that science changes, virtually at all levels, as its contents develops. 
Science, it seemed, was not characterizable in essentialist terms of any kind” (Cordero 1991, pp. 400-401). 
4 This is the most traditionally acknowledged Empiricist criterion and, for some philosophers of science, the 
only one, according to the principle of Knowledge Empiricism: “if the data alone do not suffice to determine a 
theory’s truth-value, then nothing does” (Douven 2005, p. 282). 
5 This desideratum responds to the ideal of scientific unification and aims at avoiding the multiplication of 
explanatory principles (Kitcher 1989). 
 Even if Kuhn’s text does not say it explicitly (although it is rather implied by the term 
“choice” and by his examples), it seems clear that, in general circumstances, these criteria 
cannot be just applied qualitatively. This is not just a checklist that theories must go through. 
We will typically be in a gradual and comparative situation.6 The idea is to choose the theory 
that is deemed more precise, coherent, ample, simple and (or) fruitful among the available 
alternatives. What Kuhn does emphasize, instead (as he already did in the “Postcript”), is the 
problematic character of the operative, i.e. argumentative, use of such criteria. He mentions 
two distinct problems (Kuhn 1977, p. 322): 
 
a) “[c]riteria are imprecise: individuals may legitimately differ about their 
application to concrete cases”; 
b) “[w]hen deployed together, they repeatedly prove to conflict with one 
another”. 
 
Surprisingly enough, Kuhn says that these difficulties are “relatively familiar” so that he will 
“devote little time to their elaboration” (Kuhn 1977, p. 322). They are, of course, in the sense 
that we find them everywhere in our daily lives, but this doesn’t mean that they cannot be 
better clarified. I claim that the examples from the history of science that Kuhn offers in order 
to just “briefly illustrate” these problems merit some analysis on our part with the help of our 
contemporary argumentative tools.  
Because it is precisely in them that Kuhn’s final suggestion that the criteria work, (i.e. 
argumentatively speaking) as values and not as rules is, in practical terms, though perhaps 
more ostensibly than explicitly, exposed. 
  
3. The Argumentative Working of Values 
 
So we have problem a), imprecise criteria, and problem b), conflicting criteria. Regarding 
problem a), Kuhn assumes that there is, again, no algorithm, no univocal rule to attribute to 
a scientific theory the kind of characteristics listed by him. Not even comparatively speaking. 
Thus, comparative attribution of these desiderata (as Kuhn calls them in other texts, Cf. Kuhn 
1983) is the first argumentative situation he describes. Reasons, i.e. substantive reasons, 
based on substantive warrants (not on purely semantic or formal rules)7 must be adduced for 
such comparative attributions, and this means that there might be controversies between 
opposing but, in principle, likely reasonable comparative attributions. 
His example to illustrate this problem is the conflict (end of 18th c.) between the “theory 
of phlogiston” (defended by Georg E. Stahl) and the “theory of oxygen” (defended by 
Antoine Lavoisier) in the chemistry of combustion, regarding the first criterion, accuracy. 
 
6 This is not incompatible with there being some threshold of compliance that would simply exclude some 
manifestly implausible or inadequate theories. 
7 In another paper (Olmos forthcoming 2), I attribute to such substantive warrants the following two properties 
(insofar as they are verbalized or made explicit, something that does not always happen or need to happen): i) 
their general (or regular) but typically non-universal character (i.e. their not being universally quantified 
statements) and ii) the substantive as opposed to formal nature of the relation they express (so that they always 
mention a respect, a concept, containing the alleged kind of link between reason and claim that goes beyond 
formal derivation). 
 
According to Kuhn, both theories presented a certain degree of accuracy –in connection with 
different aspects of the phenomena involved– that made reasonable the comparative 
attribution of the criterion in favor of one or of the other, thus: 
 
 Oxygen theory correctly predicts (or explains) weigh 
relations in chemical reactions. Phlogiston theory does not. 
The accuracy of a scientific 
theory is attributed on the 
basis of its predictive (or 
explanatory) capacity: 
So 
 Oxygen theory is more accurate than phlogiston theory. 
 
 
 Phlogiston theory correctly predicts (or explains) the chemical 
similarity between metals. Oxygen theory does not. 
The accuracy of a scientific 
theory is attributed on the 
basis of its predictive (or 
explanatory) capacity: 
So 
 Phlogiston theory is more accurate than oxygen theory 
 
Acknowledging the rational (and even field-adequate) character of both initial attributions, 
in a situation like this, what rationality dictates is that we keep looking for further criteria to 
ground our choice (as Siegel sensibly suggested). As Kuhn points out:  
 
[a] scientist would need to decide the area in which accuracy was more 
significant. About that matter chemists could and did differ without violating any 
of the criteria outlined above, or any others yet to be suggested. (Kuhn 1977, p. 
323). 
 
Kuhn is right but, stopping here, he does not specify that those who make such decisions will 
typically, in a public and collective sphere as is that of science, be required to offer reasons 
to back them too, in a second argumentative situation that calls for meta-argumentative 
weighing (Olmos 2016).  
I will suggest here that a possible (just one possible) weighing judgment about “the 
significance of one area above the other”, in this particular case, could be based on the 
appreciation of the measurable (i.e. quantitative, metric concepts) over the qualitatively 
appreciated (i.e. qualitative concepts) that characterizes certain developments in modern (and 
contemporary) science. This kind of balance between opposing arguments can be 
diagrammed thus:8 
  
 
8 Measurability (using metric concepts) could be another of those criteria “yet to be suggested” as a criterion 
for eligible scientific theories –it has been, in fact, by some philosophers of science. Such use of one criterion 
or desideratum to weigh up conflicting attributions of another criterion, or conflicts between different criteria, 
will be discussed later. 
 
 Weigh relations in chemical reactions are measurable. Chemical similarity between 
metals is a qualitative concept. 
Metric concepts 
(magnitudes) 
characterize 
advanced 
science: 
So 
  Oxygen theory 
correctly predicts 
(or explains) weigh 
relations in 
chemical reactions. 
Phlogiston theory 
does not. 
> 
Phlogiston theory 
correctly predicts 
(or explains) the 
chemical similarity 
between metals. 
Oxygen theory does 
not. 
 
 The accuracy of 
a scientific 
theory is 
measured by its 
predictive (or 
explanatory) 
capacity: 
So So 
The accuracy of 
a scientific 
theory is 
measured by its 
predictive (or 
explanatory) 
capacity: 
  Oxygen theory is 
more accurate than 
phlogiston theory. 
Phlogiston theory is 
more accurate than 
oxygen theory 
 
 So 
 The kind of accuracy shown by oxygen theory seems more promising for scientific 
development than the kind of accuracy showed by phlogiston theory.  
 So 
 I (Lavoisier speaks) choose oxygen theory and recommend that choice 
 
Notice the agent-related character of the conclusion and its practical nature as a personal 
decision and a recommendation to the relevant community. It is human agents that recognize 
non-formal, non-purely-semantic reasons for a conclusion9 and that propose them to be 
discussed and assessed by other human agents. 
And yet, in this case, we are still lucky. We have been able to reconstruct the conflicting 
comparative attributions of accuracy as based on the same warrant (added by me, but implied 
by Kuhn’s way of presenting the case), what makes them more easily comparable by a rather 
simple balance judgment. But Kuhn is conscious that this is not always so easy. Problem a), 
imprecision, does not only affect the way we comparatively attribute one criterion, 
understood in a single, agreed-on, way. It might also be the outcome of different conceptions 
of (or different ways of attributing) what is deemed to be the same criterion. 
 
9 What J. Woods (2016, p. 101) conceptualizes as properly understood inferences, insisting on “the depth of the 
implication-inference divide” and the distinction between the logical space of relations between statements and 
the psychological space of consequence recognition and drawing: “If consequence-having obtains in logical 
space, consequence-spotting occurs elsewhere. It occurs in psychological space – in the spotter’s head, indeed 
in his “recognition subspace”, as we might say. If so, consequence-drawing likewise occurs in psychological 
space, in a sub-region of psychological space which I’ll call his “inference subspace”, within which 
consequences are believed for a reason, and the reason is supplied by the premisses from which that conclusion 
follows. It is easy to see that consequence-spotting and consequence-drawing are natural processes. When they 
occur they do so on the four-dimensional wordline of some or other individual”. 
This is what happens in another of Kuhn’s historical examples: Heliocentric 
(Copernicus’) vs. Geocentric (Ptolemy’s) astronomical systems. He will use this example 
mainly to illustrate problem b), i.e. conflicting criteria (namely the conflict between 
simplicity and consistency), but he further acknowledges that simplicity itself might be 
comparably attributed on also conflicting grounds thus: 
 
 
 Heliocentric theory and geocentric theory require more or less 
the same calculating effort to predict the position of a planet 
at a particular time 
Simplicity is attributed on 
the basis of the operations 
the use of a theory 
requires: 
So 
 Heliocentric and Geocentric theories are equivalent in 
simplicity 
 
 
 Heliocentric theory describes the trajectories of the planets as 
simple circles. Geocentric theory describes the trajectories of 
the planets as circular motions around circles (epicicles). 
Simplicity is attributed on 
the basis of the ontological 
austerity or clarity of the 
model a theory defines: 
So 
 Heliocentric theory is simpler than Geocentric theory 
 
 
According to Kuhn’s presentation of the historical case, the conflicting grounds (different 
warrants) present here a final result in which there is, at least superficially, one tie and one 
win for Heliocentrism. We could say that Heliocentrism takes the overall win at simplicity. 
But it is not difficult to imagine that conflicting grounds could issue two opposite assessments 
(as in the case of the oxygen and the phlogiston). The looked for meta-criterion, then, would 
have to weigh what’s different in both (the warrants, in this case, not the way the same 
warrant allows for conflicting comparative attributions).  
For the sake of the argument, let us imagine that Kuhn would have suggested that (at 
least at some point in its development) Ptolemy’s theory required less calculations although 
demanding a more entangled geometry. We still could attribute to early 17th c. scientists, as 
Galileo or Kepler, a decision favoring Heliocentrism based on, for example, a choice for 
realistic vs. merely instrumental scientific theories (another value-like criterion). I represent 
such a weighing argument in the following diagram. (Notice, I’m not suggesting the historical 
accuracy of this line of argument, just trying to illustrate the argumentative workings of such 
a possibility): 
  
 
 Simple calculations for predictions are valued for instrumental reasons alone. 
Geometrical austerity is valued for the ontological plausibility of the models it 
describes. 
Science aspires to 
more than 
instrumental 
theories 
(Scientific 
realism): 
So 
  
Heliocentric theory 
requires more 
calculating effort to 
predict the position 
of a planet at a 
particular time than 
geocentric theory 
< 
Heliocentric theory 
describes the 
trajectories of the 
planets as simple 
circles. Geocentric 
theory describes the 
trajectories of the 
planets as circular 
motions around circles 
(epicicles). 
 
 Simplicity is 
attributed on the 
basis of the 
calculations a 
theory requires: 
So So 
Simplicity is 
attributed on 
the basis of 
geometric 
austerity: 
  Geocentric theory is 
simpler than 
heliocentric theory 
Heliocentric theory is 
simpler than geocentric 
theory 
 
 So 
 The kind of simplicity shown by Heliocentrism is more promising for scientific 
endeavor than the kind of simplicity shown by Geocentrism 
 So 
 I choose Heliocentrism and recommend that choice 
 
Notice that here a qualitative aspect of simplicity is being valued over a quantitative one 
(contrary to what was assumed in the first weighing on oxygen and phlogiston theories) in a 
somewhat reasonable and recognizable (though not unanswerable) way. This means that if, 
as suggested in note 5, should measurability (or other value-like criterion) be added to the 
list, it would not help to close, in any algorithmic way, the rationality gap. That measurability 
is a recognizable scientific criterion does not mean that it is always going to play a decisive 
role (or the same kind of role) in theoretical choices.  
But in these comments I’m going rather beyond Kuhn. He really just presents this 
example assuming that heliocentric theory is finally simpler in the proper way and that the 
real problem arises, in this particular case, from the conflict between simplicity and another 
criterion, namely consistency. He states, furthermore, that both theories appeared to be 
“internally” consistent but that Geocentrism remained more akin to the human perception of 
a stable planet and more consistent with received theories in physics (about projectiles, water 
pumping etc.).  
So, in addition to the comparative judgments on simplicity, 17th century scientist had 
to count on the following comparative (and in this case conflicting) judgment on the 
consistency of both theories: 
 Geocentric theory (stationary Earth) is consistent 
with human perception and with received physics. 
Heliocentric theory (moving Earth) is not. 
External consistency is attributed on the 
basis of compatibility with other accepted 
theories and background assumptions: 
So 
 Geocentric theory is more “externally” consistent 
than heliocentric theory 
 
The way Kuhn refers to Galileo and Kepler’s bold acceptance of Heliocentrism is not initially 
very clear about the reasons behind their choice. He only says that the simplicity of 
Copernican theory was “a fact vitally important to the choices made by Kepler and Galileo” 
(Kuhn 1977, p. 324).  
Nevertheless, we may assume, for example (again, no historical accuracy is intended), 
that their prevision of what this theory could bring in terms of a unified physics for both the 
Earth and the Heavens was crucial. It seems reasonable enough. This would mean, again, 
using some of the remaining criteria in the list (either broad scope or fruitfulness) as a meta-
criterion, to “solve” (always in a non-algorithmic way), conflicts created by the clash between 
other items in the list, thus: 
 
 Geometric simplicity will allow for further developments in understanding the Universe 
and for the comprehension of earthly phenomena within a more general framework 
The broader 
scope and 
fruitfulness of a 
theory make it 
preferable: 
So 
  
Geocentric theory 
(stationary Earth) is 
consistent with 
human perception 
and received 
physics. 
Heliocentric theory 
(moving Earth) is 
not. 
< 
Heliocentric theory 
describes the 
trajectories of the 
planets as simple 
circles. Geocentric 
theory describes the 
trajectories of the 
planets as circular 
motions around 
circles (epicicles). 
 
 External 
consistency is 
attributed on the 
basis of 
compatibility with 
other accepted 
theories: 
So So 
Simplicity is 
attributed on 
the basis of 
geometric 
austerity: 
  Geocentric theory 
is more 
“externally” 
consistent than 
heliocentric theory 
Heliocentric theory 
is simpler than 
Geocentric theory 
 
 So 
 I (Kepler or Galileo) choose Heliocentrism and recommend that choice 
 
I think it is starting to be clear how this kind of argumentative workings is similar to that of 
values in other kinds of argumentative settings. In, for example, political or legal discussions 
or, simply, in daily life and quotidian decisions, as Kuhn suggests (1977, p. 330). They clash, 
they are difficult to order, they might be used to account for choices but then those choices 
might be contested on their account. They keep demanding from us to offer reasons and meta-
reasons in defense of the choices they influence (not determine). And still it is not as if we 
(or scientists in this case) would have nothing to cling to: 
 
Values like accuracy, consistency, and scope may prove ambiguous in 
application, both individually and collectively; they may, that is, be insufficient 
basis for a shared algorithm of choice. But they do specify a great deal: what 
each scientist must consider in reaching a decision, what he may and may not 
consider relevant, and what he can legitimately be required to report as the basis 
for the choice he had made. (Kuhn 1977, p. 331). 
 
We are now in a position to sum up what functioning as values and not as rules means 
argumentatively speaking. It means at least that: 
 
i. Their attribution functions as a “value judgment” (“value claim”, Cf. Schiappa & 
Nordin 2014, p. 71ss), that is, an evaluative not a factual expression, conveying an 
agent-related positive attitude towards the object to which it is attributed. Arguments 
supporting such attributions are to be understood, therefore, as “evaluative arguments” 
(not theoretical ones). 
 
ii. Attribution of values is typically a matter of degree. We should not expect 
qualitative “value claims” assessable in a bivalent way; we will always be in a gradual 
and comparative situation. Thus, the norm associated to a value (its attribution warrant) 
will typically not be of the kind stating “necessary and sufficient conditions”, but 
substantive grounds for comparative attribution. As we have seen, the norm of 
attribution itself might also have to be selected among several recognizable 
possibilities. It is usually not a settled question how we attribute what we consider a 
value. 
 
iii. Values are associated to contexts and practices where their satisfaction or 
maximization is assumed as desirable or commendable. That means that the positive 
attitude towards the evaluated object will typically be used as a reason for its eligibility 
in what finally becomes a “practical argument” describing and prescribing an action 
(in this case, a “theoretical choice” that implies a series of practical decisions). 
 
iv. Similarly, as theorists of legal argument know well, value-based practical choices 
typically respond to principles of maximization (e.g. “Act so as to maximize the 
satisfaction of values v1, v2…vn”) not to strict decision rules that allow for subsumption 
(e.g. “If conditions a, b, c, obtain, do X”, Cf. Alexy 1983). That is, actions are selected 
from a somewhat indeterminate set of available ones as maximizing the joint 
satisfaction of different values. We do not count on simple decision rules prescribing 
actions based on the objective description of situations. That is a consequence of all the 
things we have already said together with the basic consideration that the contexts and 
practices in which values count are typically multi-value contexts. If there was just one 
value, and that value would not be subject to the problems of comparative and 
conflicting attribution we have described, it would not really function as a value. 
Criteria such as those presented by Kuhn are not values in any essential way, they 
function as values. If accuracy (the usual suspect) was the only scientific value, as 
some think it is, it would not function as a value anymore. It would just either determine 
or underdetermine theory choice, but not make room for any discussion. A value 
approach implies a multiplicity of values and all the argumentative problems (or 
exuberance) concerned. 
 
v. Choices based on value claims (practical decisions based on reasonable evaluations) 
call for complicated (sophisticated) argumentation. They typically imply demands for 
backing (because warrants and warrant choices are not obvious), weighing procedures 
and are finally open to further demands for better grounding. 
 
That scientific justificatory practice responds to these characteristics is Kuhn’s claim. And it 
challenges certain expectations regarding science as a demonstrative (or at least simply 
evidentiary) realm, while it seems to respond better to its characterization as a forensic 
activity (Woods 2017, pp. 143-144). And a highly disputed one, for that matter, that has given 
place to extensive, time-consuming and necessarily collective controversies that still leave 
room for further arguments.  
This does not mean that any kind of reason and basis will be considered appropriate 
and relevant in scientific choice, but just that no simple, allegedly decisive, logical (formal 
or semantic) scheme will account for its rationality. This is good news for us because there 
is a lot of argumentative work to do just in terms of the appropriate description of such 
practices and the recognition of the field-related norms that govern them. Kuhn’s was in any 
case a step in the right direction. 
 
4. Objectivity within the Space of Reasons 
 
Kuhn finally addresses the crucial issue of objectivity. If things stand how he has described 
them. If scientific choices are based on the debatable attributions of not really well-defined 
(or variably definable) criteria that function as values that, can be just satisfied to a certain 
(comparable) degree, that clash with each other, and that argumentatively justify choices that 
can still be resisted… where does the supposed objectivity of science remain? 
 Paradoxically enough, Kuhn’s answer is that the objectivity of science is really based 
on subjectivity. Not any kind of subjectivity but judgmental subjectivity (Kuhn 1977, pp. 
336ss). This is Kuhn’s second dissociative move. He supports this idea by exposing the 
judgmental character of value-claims that are not necessarily just a question of personal taste 
(with no further reasons expected) but are nevertheless necessarily a question of personal 
judgment (because it is people that judge) for which rational grounds can be (and typically 
will be) asked: 
 
What is discussable in my remark [that a certain film is a potboiler] is not my 
characterization of my internal state, my exemplification of taste, but rather my 
judgment that the film was a potboiler. […] scientists may always be asked to 
explain their choices, to exhibit the bases for their judgments. Such judgments 
are eminently discussable […] If my critics introduce the term subjective in a 
sense that opposes it to judgmental –thus suggesting that I make theory choice 
undiscussable, a matter of taste– they have seriously mistaken my position (Kuhn 
1977, p. 337). 
 
In empirical science we cannot resort to completely objectified agent-independent (formal or 
semantic) relations between also completely objective contents. Empirical (vs. formal) 
science is not the kind of practice that’s determined by logical, impersonal, relations that 
obtain within a logical space (where “there are no people”, as J. Woods says, 2016, p. 101). 
Conclusions drawn (by scientists) in empirical science are instead guided by substantive 
relations (based on warrants) conceived of, recognized and proposed for recognition and 
acceptance by agents and for other agents (and related to their personal experiences that make 
of them rational agents).  
Science is assessed in the public space of argument, where the psychological space of 
inference, as construed by J. Woods (2016) is either put to communicative work (as in 
Woods’ inference-based account of reasons) or is ultimately founded (as in an argument-
based account of reasons). In either case, as Kuhn insists once and again although using a 
different vocabulary, all this implies the agent-related nature of processes involving the 
recognition of values as sources of reasons. No algorithm is going to take the decision for a 
scientist. Scientists must move within a space of reasons where they are asked to be 
relevantly rational (Cf. Section 2), that is, summon, recognize and give appropriate and field-
related reasons and be prepared to substantively respond to other agents’ counter-reasons. 
Objectivity within the space of reasons is, therefore, a result of collective, public 
discussion, not a prerequisite of the kinds of reasons involved in such a discussion. As a 
global (rather holistic) result, it is founded on the joint concourse of individual, personal and 
subjective, but in any case relevantly judgmental, contributions.  
Again such kind of objectivity is not conceptually construed, as a success term (or an 
achievement-centered notion) acquiring instead a procedural or methodological ring. The 
result of a well conducted scientific discussion (according to the standards of the field) would 
be objective (as a currently valid theory is deemed to be objective) and yet subject to further 
questioning and new value judgments (personally made by human agents) in view of the 
contributions of other human agents. And, as Kuhn maintains, this is not “an eliminable 
imperfection” but “the essential nature of science”. 
 
5. The Rational Dynamics of Science 
 
Finally, for Kuhn, science and scientific choices are not only rational and objective in spite 
of the absence of an algorithmic or quasi-algorithmic methodology, but precisely thanks to 
such an absence. The positive evaluation of this situation for science as a collective endeavor 
on the part of Kuhn comes from his estimation of “time” (research time, reflection time, 
discussion time) as a commodity that improves scientific validation. The problem with 
decision algorithms, even of probabilistic algorithms, is their supposedly instantaneous 
workings. Good science needs time, as it needs people using that time: 
 
Copernicus’s system, for example, was not more accurate than Ptolemy’s until 
drastically revised by Kepler more than sixty years after Copernicus’s death. If 
Kepler or someone else had not found other reasons to choose heliocentric 
astronomy, those improvements in accuracy would never have been made, and 
Copernicus’s work might have been forgotten (Kuhn 1977, p. 323). 
 
Allowing for time to count is what makes possible the justificatory dynamics of science. In 
Kuhn’s terms, standard criteria (i.e. the array of scientific values) should have a role in 
choices made at the early stages of a theory, and the recognition (by others than the 
proponent) of this necessarily imperfect compliance with them, as field-relevant guides, is 
what makes possible the survival of a new idea that may eventually be improved (Kuhn 1977, 
p. 331-332).  
If time is needed –and it has been needed, since science is what we understand it to be–
, then scientific methodology and the measure of its correction, i.e. its rationality, the 
objectivity of its conclusions, cannot be of any instantaneous kind (and this is, precisely, what 
happens when we philosophically construe them as success terms). As Kuhn points out, if 
scientists would share an algorithmic methodology “all conforming scientists would make 
the same decision at the same time” (Kuhn 1977, p. 332), and this would give no time either 
for a prospective (and yet much imperfect) new idea to enter the pool of candidate theories 
or for the traditional one to yet survive, awaiting new developments. 
This high estimation of “time”, of “collective work” and also of the scientific “division 
of labor” is present in the (either simply descriptive or normative) proposals of many 
contemporary philosophers of science, especially those of a pragmatist inclination (Cf. 
Hacking 1983, Kitcher 2012). However, the consequences this has for the argumentative 
understanding of scientific justificatory practice have not been, in my opinion, sufficiently 
stressed. And I would add, that Kuhn’s old paper is closer to what we need in that direction 
than other more contemporary suggestions. 
Time is also, ultimately, one of Kuhn’s mitigators of the problems of 
incommensurability between paradigms or disciplinary matrixes (Kuhn 1974). New theories 
often come with new ideas about how to order and weigh different values –even if we assume 
that the basic core of scientific values remains constitutive of science. But if everything 
comes at the same time and offered to be accepted in one pack, it is difficult to avoid problems 
of circularity and the barrier between those who accept and those who reject the whole pack 
becomes rather insurmountable. In Kuhn’s words: 
 
Clearly, if such value changes had occurred as rapidly or been as complete as the 
theory changes to which they are related, then theory choice would be value 
choice, and neither could provide justification to the other (Kuhn 1977, p. 336). 
 
The other incommensurability mitigator, as I understand it, mentioned in “Objectivity…” (in 
its last paragraph, and with very little elaboration) is the possibility that scientist that do not 
share a paradigm, a conceptual network or a common vocabulary may nevertheless still 
“exhibit to each other, not always easily, the concrete technical results achievable by those 
who practice within each theory” (Kuhn 1977, p. 339). 
 There could be room, I claim, to render this idea into the framework of “visual 
argument from ostension” (Marraud 2018), but it is not my intention to do so at this time. 
My point is, instead, that in his 1977 paper, Kuhn really struggled (even against the usual 
implications some of his most cherished ideas) to look for ways to account for the rationality 
of scientific choices. If, in Siegel’s terms (1980, p. 366) he could not “have it both ways” 
(see Section 2), it seems that, at least in this paper, he chose to emphasize one of them, and 
bring the other to a minimum. And the way he chose, even if he did not really make use of 
argumentative vocabulary, is more than highly compatible with some of our contemporary 
approaches in argumentation studies. 
 
6. Conclusion: The Value of Judgmental Subjectivity 
 
In this paper I have tried to do two things. One is using some analytical and conceptual tools 
developed within argumentation theory in order to explore and clarify Kuhn’s insights in his 
well-known 1977 article “Objectivity, Value Judgment and Theory Choice”. The other is 
defending the idea that, beyond the particulars of the set of scientific values proposed by 
Kuhn and even beyond their rational (related to reason-giving or argumentative) workings, 
it is Kuhn’s suggestion that the ultimate normative concept of science is not exactly 
objectivity but judgmentability that deserves our greatest notice. 
Such judgmentability is subjective insofar as it is agent-related (only human agents 
recognize non-algorithmic reasons and draw conclusions thereof) and should be conceptually 
construed not as a set of a priori conditions (of success) a certain content may prove to have 
for being judgmental, but as the condition a certain content acquires by being presented for 
its examination, questioning and judging (by others than its proponent) in the public arena of 
argumentative practice. 
This judgmental subjectivity is, thus, the decisive value that covers, in fact, all kinds of 
argumentative practices. Insofar as we understand the scientific way of establishing (still 
fallible) conclusions as based on collective argumentative practices, judgmental subjectivity 
will be its basic condition. 
In a paper critically examining the “practical character of scientific rationality”, J. Vega 
(2011, pp. 145-146) enounces three normative conditions regarding the kinds of reasons that 
we may expect would constitute the “practical identity of science”: 
 
a) Publicity: any reason adduced within a scientific community must be publicly 
expressed. 
b) Reliability: all good reasons are linked to processes evaluated according to their 
reliability. 
c) Reflexivity: scientific community is involved in a collective process, on which its 
epistemic authority relies, carried out through reflexive strategies leading to the 
continuous assessment of the epistemic position from which it exercises its activity. 
 
Conditions a) and c) can be easily understood as demanding an argumentative setting (as the 
one I have depicted here) for scientific choices. Condition b) is more problematic as its 
compliance could be exactly one of the things that is at stake in scientific argumentation. The 
options with this condition would be trying to flesh it out in terms of further conditions for 
reliability (as some epistemologists do) or expecting from the observance of conditions a) 
and c) that scientists themselves would come out with adequate standards. What Kuhn shows 
us, in any case, is that such standards, even if well established, stabilized, agreed on and 
honored by the relevant community will not be of the kind to completely determine the right 
answer so as to dispense us from conditions a) and c). 
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